Enrique Escalante
Associate Professor of Economics · Angelo State University
The political economy of violence and development.
Development economics · Political conflict & regimes · Applied econometrics
Research themes
Self-defense under terror
Why did Peru’s peasant patrols against the Shining Path govern themselves democratically in the north and through commandos in the south? An organizational theory of defense: the time horizon a threat imposes shapes how vigilante groups organize.
Whose miracle?
Did Chile need a dictator to grow? A synthetic Chile without the 1973 coup out-earned the real one for fifteen years, which challenges the myth of the benevolent autocrat.
The rebel’s dilemma
Why do some insurgencies court the public while others hide in the shadows? Peru’s Shining Path and MRTA show the trade-off between seeking legitimacy and keeping secrets.
Publications
“The Odd Couple: Formal and Informal Governance in the Making of Fiscal Capacity”
Journal of Comparative Economics · forthcoming
“Friends or Foes? The Insurgent’s Dilemma of Seeking Legitimacy While Keeping Secrets”
World Development · 2026 · Interactive summary →
“Por la Razón o la Fuerza: What Caused Chile’s Economic Miracle?”
in The Pinochet Shock, Palgrave Macmillan · 2025
“A Self-Defense Network against Terrorism and Crime: Evidence from Peru”
Terrorism and Political Violence · 2023 · Interactive summary →
“The Influence of Pinochet in the Chilean Miracle”
Latin American Research Review · 2022 · Interactive summary →
“A Government Role Conducive to Liberty: Operation Warp Speed” (with Peter C. Earle)
in Pandemics and Liberty, American Institute for Economic Research · 2022
“Night Watchers and Terrorists”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization · 2020 · Interactive summary →
“Fighting on Christmas: Brawling as Self-Governance in Rural Peru” (with Raymond March)
Journal of Institutional Economics · 2020 · Interactive summary →